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we must appoint a committee...
.. on ways and means..
one chairman will do for several committees
and the rising cry of the people
resign, resign, resign
Coriolon: Ode for a Statesman
T. S. Eliot
The February, 1976, Ministerial Meeting of the
Group of 77 (now well over 100 strong) resolved
to create a permanent secretariat. The 7th Special
Session of the General Assembly in September,
1975, set up a body of wise men to consider
structural reform of the United Nations system.
Even the IMF and IBRDponderously, slowly
and cautiously as one would expect of weighty
bankersexperiment with new strategy negotiat-
ing bodies which draw half of their membership
from the Third World and have quite real poten-
tial power. Administrative and institutional re-
forms are, one might almost be intoxicated into
believing, to be the twin midwives of the New
International Economic Order or even the
anointed guides to the New Jerusalem.
Or are they? Six years ago the Grand Assizes of
Jackson and Pearson, combined with the Second
Development Decade model on which Professor
Tinbergen and his colleagues had lavished so
much effort, were greeted with even more rap-
turous hosannahs. Then too a rationalisation,
sanitisation, bureaucratisation and co-ordination
of international organisations was to sweep away
contradictions, controversies and constraints and
make the world free of polemics, poverty and
politics and safe for gross domestic product,
growth and grandma.' "Where are the snows of
yesteryear? Where are the flowers of spring?"
as Villon wrote from his prison cell. The
administrative and institutional reform crusade
of 1969-70 could be 60 or 160 years in the past,
so hard is it to recall, let alone recreate, the hopes
1 Certainly there were sceOtics. At Barbara Ward's major
launching conference on the Pearson Report, a ma;orlty of
the participants signed the Columbia Declaration which
tenidly endorses the report as a weak, late first step but m
effect rejects the entire growthmarsship base of both Pearson
and the Second Development Decade. But most of the
critics felt constrained to be muted and to say "Yes, but
also .....not "No!".
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and faiths it called forth. ". . . here we go round
the mulberry bush . . . this is the way the world
ends . . . not with a bang but with a whimper"
is their epitaph as it has been of so many hopes
to achieve a brave new world by administrative
reform.
Some basic issues
What are the basic issues in administrative or
institutional reform? When are changes needed?
helpful? escapist? Is the whole subject banal at
best and a destructive form of self deception at
worst? A closer scrutiny does suggest a few
guide-posts.
1. Institutions and their structures are machinery
not products, means not ends. They cannot cause
anything to happen. However, they canby
absence or inappropriatenessprevent things
from happening or happening as rapidly or as
effectively as desired.
2 Therefore before creating, reforming or elimin-
ating an institution the first question which needs
asking is: what ends is it intended to serve? The
next question is: who benefits from achieving
those ends and who loses enough to seek to block
either the creation or the intended functioning of
the institution ?
From the identification of ends and actors it is
possible to proceed to the question of methods.
Eliminating illiteracy, transferring technology and
reorganising the market relations for primary
commodities can hardly be tackled by the same
methods.
Only after ends, actors and method are identi-
fied is there an adequate framework within which
to consider issues of institutional structure, mem-
bership, administration and operation. The Group
of 25 on the UN System clearly faced the prob-
lem that it was setthe task of reforming institu-
tionswithout any prior agreement as to what
the institutions were to achieve. It "solved" the
problem by defining a set of global goals and UN
roles in achieving them and then considering
how to structure the UN institutional family to
play those roles. This approach at least produces
a potentially consistent approach. However, it
runs the risk of confusing ends and means and
also the risk of setting ends which are more
representative of the advisors' views than of the
interests of those they are advising. That danger
is compounded when a high proportion of the
advisors are administrators, managers and allied
functionaries.
Because ends and methods vary, so will appro-
priate institutional arrangements. Operational and
technical bodies (e.g. ICAO, UNICEF); global
negotiating forums (e.g. in different ways the
General Assembly, UNCTAD and perhaps the
ILO); regional interest balancing forums (e.g.
the Group of 77, OECD); special-purpose ne-
gotiating bodies (e.g. the former Group of 20
for global monetary reform); specialist advisory
and technical units (e.g. DAC or the Third World's
Group of 24 for monetary and financial matters);
special interest-furthering bodies (e.g. OPEC and
its parallel on the consumer side); and global
or regional policy-setting units (e.g. the General
Assembly, logicallyif not in practiceUN
Regional Commissions, the Councils of the East
African Community, the EEC and the Andean
Pact)all these different types of organs have
quite different institutional needs. To assume a
standard all-purpose institutional model is usually
the first several steps on the road to muddle and
ineffectiveness.
Because both ends and methods and objective
conditions (e.g. power of actors, technology,
resources) change, the idea of once-for-all institu-
tional reform is a chimera. Nor is it sensible to
aim at uniformity and neatness2 because of the
varied roles of institutions and because most
institutions will have one predominant and other
secondary roles. Articulation and co-ordination,
not homegeneity and monolithicism, are practical
operating goals for institution builders, reformers
or eliminators.
Goals and institutions
If one applies these guidelines for the creation of
institutions a key question emerges. What goals
seriously sought by significant numbers of coun-
tries are made much harder to achieve by lack
of appropriate institutional vehicles, and what
type of institutions could fill the gaps? Looked at
in terms of the quest for a New International
Economic Order three glaring gaps exist: Third
World technical-level co-ordination to advise and
inform political forums; Third World and regional
interest group and operational institutions which
2 For example institutional structure charts are both misleading
and non-neutral. Misleading because institutions do not exist
in two dimensional space nor, usually, with a very limited
number cf internal and external relationships. Non-neutral
because a centralised, pyramidal hierarchy with top-down
flows of orders, bottom-up delivery of information and
strictly limited and prescribed participation and co-ordination
at subordinate levels is easier to draw and explain and does
"look better" on paper, however inappropriate to broader ends
or even institutional operationality it may be.
are genuinely of, for and in peripheral polities-
economies-societies; and ad hoc specialist nego-
tiating forums which can arrive at technically
feasible solutions informed by an understanding
of basic political economic goals, constraints and
power balances and therefore at least moderately
likely to be ratified and scheduled for implemen-
tation at the political decision taking level.
In this context the Group of 77's decision to create
a permanent secretariat may be a major step
forward. If the peripheral economies are to act
together as a "trade union of the poor" or in
joint "co-operation against poverty" they require
research and analysis at an operational level
from a professional staff primarily concerned with
identifying and articulating ways of furthering
common interests. The duty of global institutions
(e.g. UNCTAD) to all their members and the
need for them to be able to act as credible honest
brokers proposing acceptable compromises means
that they cannot fulfil this role. (The Integrated
Commodity Approach is rnisconceived as a Third
World "extreme" position simply because no
coherent and detailed Third World position to
counterbalance the minimalist First World non-
proposals has ever emerged. It is, in fact, a good
example of an imaginative honest-broker initiative
to achieve a compromise.) The limited data and
professional resources of individual Third World
countries add to the potential importance of ajoint body but they do not create it. National
units would (quite properly and inevitably)
operate primarily from what they perceive as
national interests and secondarily from their
rather special perceptions of mutual interests.
Furtherpartly as a resultprofessional and
technical work done at the national level would
be viewed with at least some scepticism by other
Third World country decision-takers. Therefore,
the need to pool resources, the need to co-ordinate
and the need for an agreed technical infrastruc-
ture for political level strategies and proposals are
complementary arguments for a "Third World
OECD". Without it the unity of pronouncements
will either be illusory, unimplementable because
unarticulated, or non-negotiable because a shop-
ping list has been substituted for a set of goals
ranked in priority order, of tradeoffs and mini-
mum packages.
Common interest institutions
The creation of a network of interest-group and
operating institutions within the Third World
cannot be handled both briefly and comprehen-
sively. The 1975 UNCTAD Group of Experts
on Economic Co-operation among Developing
Countries spent a signficant portion of their
report on a host of illustrative examples in trade,
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industry, technology, research, consultancy, bank-
ing and investment banking in addition to the
more standard proposals for reducing trade
barriers, facilitating clearing and payments and
promoting formal integration.
Their emphasis that what is critical is a perceived
common interest more effectively pursued jointly
than separately is a key one which, no matter
how self-evident it may seem, is frequently over-
looked. From it one can derive two critical con-
clusions. Membership minima and maxima are
determined by the nature of the common interest.
For example, the Union of Banana Exporting
Countries probably cannot be functional so long
as Ecuador is not a member; OPEC would be
weakened by broadening its membership to en-
compass either every Third World country with
a producing well or major industrial-economy
producers who are net importers. Functional
coverage should be limited to areas or to pack-
ages of areas in which, taken together, there is a
clear joint interest. Adding unrelated areas can
be divisive and dangerous. For example: the
Group of 77 should not now seek to add domestic
income distribution strategy to international
economic relations strategy; OPEC is wise not to
seek to co-ordinatemuch less integrateits
members' development planning beyond the
petroleum sector.
These observations suggest the need for a set of
multinational institutions of and in the Third
World as complex as those of and in the First.
The Andean Pact's appropriateness does not
logically militate against joint Venezuelan-Carib-
bean or Central American-Venezuelan institu-
tions; the Carribbean Development Corporation
is not an alternative to the Inter American Devel-
opment Bank.
Brief, mass conferences of generalists cannot
carry negotiations beyond the level of general
agreed targets and constraints. Only more ex-
tended, limited working groups of representatives
with specialised knowledge can do that. No matter
how self-evident that proposition may appear-
nor how well established it may be in the sphere
of industrial relations negotiationsmany inter-
national negotiations, and especially much of the
history of UNCTAD, exemplify failure to act
on it.
New global institutions
UNCTAD might succeed in building on the very
general and tentative fabric of apparent con-
sensus on short term international economic order
goals and possible means for achieving them
which the 7th Special Session reached. It might
arrive at agreement on a dozen priority opera-
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tional goals (e.g. Joint Commodity Fund, some
variant of indexation, phased freedom of access
for Third World manufactures, eight major com-
modity agreements) and on target dates for
achieving them. Even if it does, however, un-
clarity remains as to how such a skeleton of
agreement could be clothed with the muscles and
skin of detailed provisions and institutional
modalities. Its universal membership committees
with broad mandates and generalist participants
could not get on with the job.
The solution would appear to lie in a series of
smaller, specified-purpose, limited-life-expectancy
bodies with membership based on a constituency
system and varying from topic to topic. The
Group of 20 was perhaps the first exercise along
these lines. It was a procedural success. Its efforts
were in the end swamped and its mandate ren-
dered irrelevant by the 1974-7? world monetary
disturbances, born of the inflation and recession
in the major capitalist industrial economies and
of OPEC's unilateral movesafter a decade of
negotiation with those who declined to nego-
tiateto the very partial and very unbalanced
alteration of the international economic order it
could achieve. But that should not cloud either
the ability of the G20 to negotiate its way towards
rational and agreed conclusions nor the fact that
45 per cent of its membership was Third World.3
The principle of universal membership is the
barrier to such an approach. Five comments can
be made:
the terms of reference and membership of
specialist negotiating bodies would normally
come from universal (or regional) membership
institutions;
the results of any such negotiating body would
require ratification and implementation by
universal membership bodies and by individual
governments;
Third World effectiveness at this level is not
really furthered by an automatic voting
majority (as opposed to half the seats) because
to be a success a negotiation must reach con-
clusions at least minimally acceptable to those
whose ratification is essential for implemen-
tation;
a constituency system would allow each state
to put its views (and to place an advisor on its
representatives' team) while limiting the awe-
some manpower demands which participating
fully in every negotiation would entail for the
smaller states;
3 The "missing" per cent was Australiaindubitably a
dependent and peripheral economy but one which to date
has such special relations with, and attitudes toward, the
major capitalist industrial economies that it can hardly be
classed as Third World.
(e) as a result, the real bargaining expertise and
power of the Third World andprobably--of
the smaller industrial economies would be
enhanced.
Gaps and overlaps
The logical complements to creating new insti-
tutions are first to eliminate overlaps and inter-
stices4 in existing institutions and second to
rebuild those which have proved inadequate. How
one proceeds to do the former depends very much
on the degree to which effective coherence can be
achieved in goal-setting and ongoing co-ordination
at operational level. And with respect to the
latter any reformer must face the fact that how-
ever hard it may be to reconstruct an inappro-
priate institution it is usually still harder to kill it
off and start afresh.
At the strategic and policy levels overlap is par-
ticularly damaging. It may be desirable for both
UNCTAD and the World Employment Con-
ference to include trade in manufactures and the
relevance of a new world economic geography
to a New International Economic Order but
only if they do so within a common framework
and with a fairly clear division of labour on who
negotiates what.5 Various global institutional
patternsnotably not including that of the present
UN extended familymight serve that end
probably including the main approaches suggested
in the Group of 25 report. The main thrusts
would be:
to create clear and coherent relations between
strategy and policy making units on the one
hand and negotiating or operational units on
the other;
to seek a broad division of labour among the
latter units but not to the point of eliminating
efficiency and substance in the name of neat-
ness and non-overlap;
4 Very often these are joint. ILO-UNIDO-UNESCO-UNCTAD
all deal with technology transfer and development and do
so with inadequate co-ordination. As a result the transfer of
technology aspects are handled in a somewhat duplicatory
and contradictory manner while the development of innova-
tive and development capacity in Third World countries usuaily
fails into the inter-institutional interstices.
S As it happens WEC is not primarily a negotiating forum and
will be weakened by any attempt to transform it in that
direction. Its key themes of basic needs, adjustment assistance
and multinationals migration are ones whichat least today-
must be dealt with by co-ordination of national policies
among mutually concerned states. Operational global decisions
are not attainable. For the industrial world to attempt to
demand a Basic Needs-oriented strategy by the Third World
as a quid pro quo for NIlO would at best be romantic
utopianism, and, in practice, hypocritical and counterproductive.
UNCTAD, per contra should be a forum concerned with
identifying concrete areas for future, and workab1 terms of
reference for present, negotiations towards multmational-
and often globalaction. The more it wanders into "states-
manlike" discussions and "agreements" to bear mutual interests
in mind instead of laying the foundations for negotiation, the
worse. Co-ordination should be relatively easyUNCTAD's
potential areas of strength are WEC's areas of weakness and
vice versa.
to create means to co-ordinate the implemen-
tation efforts of different agencies which are
more concerned with jointly solving problems
than with the "territorial imperative"the
jealous protection of the agencies' spheres of
interest.
Institutional inadequacies often arise from a lack
of any clear set of purposese.g. the UN
Regional Commissionsor from having a set of
aims so diffuse and so little ranked in priority
order that no coherent raison d'eire or principles
for selecting activities emergee.g. UNESCO.
Both are usually associated with a lack of any
operational criteria for measuring success or
failurenot surprisingly since those who do not
know where they are trying to go are likely to be
unclear whether they are proceeding in the right
direction let alone what their probable arrival
time might be.
In this area three approaches are potentially
useful:
'Va) to identify a set of reasonably specific goals
for which a real constituency exists, which the
institution could further and for which it is
at least as competent and appropriate a vehicle
s any existing alternative;6
to structure the institution and its operations
toward furthering the identified goals in a
coherent way with clear priorities;
to create an agreed set of criteria for evaluat-
ing results. These should flow from the goals
(e.g. growth of GDP is not a usuable criterion
for measuring progress toward poverty era-
diction). They should measure outputs not
inputs (e.g. expenditure on technical assistance
is an input, transfer of knowledge and capacity
to use and develop it is the output one pre-
sumptively seeks to measure). They should be
intelligible to decision takers (e.g. a composite
index of dozens of weighted items usually
fails this test while half a dozen separate
measures might be quite readily understood
and acted on). They should not mystify or
disguise under the guise of professionalism
or precision (e.g. most present versions of
social cost benefit analysis7).
6 If no such goals can be identified then the institution shouldbe wound up, however high the hopes with which it was
created and, indeed, however valuable it may once have
been.
7 The problem is not that "non-economic" (i.e. non-GDP
growthmanship or non-profit maximising) variables are irrele-
vant. Rather it is that in seeking to put precise, subtly
computed monetary prices on them there is a grave danger
of creating an aura of objectivity and precision and thus




To argue for the setting of priorities logically
creates an obligation to state one's own. To argue
that uniformity and homogeneity are false goals
unfortunately creates a countervailing obligation
not to present one change as of transcendant
significance dwarfing all others and clearly viable
by itself. In the context of the quest for a New
International Economic Order probably three
institutional and administrative developments
have joint (and interacting) top priority:
the creation of a technical and professional
capacity to support a global Third World
decision-taking forum (i.e. the 77 or the Non-
Aligned) by providing the information and
analysis it needs.
setting up operational specialised negotiating
bodies which can transform the broad para-
meters of policy into detailed proposals for
ratification and implementation (e.g. to follow
through from the forthcoming UNCTAD);
beginning to build up a network of specialised
Third World institutions to further clearly
defined common interests, their scope and
membership being related in each case to the
particular common interest (an area in which
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the proposed 77 or Non-Aligned permanent
secretariat could play useful stimulative,
catalytic and co-ordinating roles).
If this selection suggests to the reader that in many
international organization reform proposals too
much priority is placed on global bodies, on
comprehensive UN system rebuilding and on
management consultant type quests for efficiency,
the author would not disagree. Those elements
are important but a New International Economic
Order cannot be constructed until the Third
World's ability to co-ordinate and direct its
potential power to specific, attainable objectives
(on the "trade union of the poor" and the joint
"co-operation against poverty" fronts) is enhanced
and until there are forums in which effective
negotiation is possible. To achieve the second
requires global action; but the first must flow
from a broader perception of potentials, possi-
bilities and priorities by Third World decision-
takers and technicians.
Collective self reliance and NIEO negotiating
strategies cannot be provided as packaged tech-
nical assistance imports. First and Second World
institutions or individuals can only play an
ancillary role in promoting them no matter how
intelligent and committed they may be.
